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Abstract—Pilot contamination attack is an important kind
of active eavesdropping activity conducted by a malicious user
during channel training phase. In this paper, motivated by the
fact that frequency asynchronism could introduce divergence of
the transmitted pilot signals between intended user and attacker,
we propose a new uncoordinated frequency shift (UFS) scheme
for detection of pilot contamination attack in multiple antenna
system. An attack detection algorithm is further developed based
on source enumeration method. Both the asymptotic detection
performance analysis and numerical results are provided to verify
the proposed studies. The results demonstrate that the proposed
UFS scheme can achieve comparable detection performance
as the existing superimposed random sequence based scheme,
without sacrifice of legitimate channel estimation performance.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, pilot contamination at-
tack, uncoordinated frequency shift (UFS).
I. INTRODUCTION
As an effective way to protect wireless transmissions from
being eavesdropped, physical layer security has been drawing
substantial research interests. Recent results in physical layer
security methods require full or partial knowledge about chan-
nel state information of the legitimate system, which is quite
vulnerable to smart malicious attacks. A typical example in a
TDD system is the so-called pilot contamination attack from
an active eavesdropper [1]. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the eaves-
dropper (Eve) wants to overhear the communication from the
legitimate transmitter (Alice) to the intended receiver (Bob).
During the reverse uplink training phase, Bob sends training
(pilot) signal to Alice, and the latter performs legitimate chan-
nel estimation based on channel reciprocity. Unfortunately,
during the training phase, the active eavesdropper Eve can
also send the same pilot signals, thereby biasing the channel
estimation at Alice. This not only degrades the signal reception
quality at Bob but also leads to a significant signal leakage to
Eve during the subsequent downlink data transmission.
The issue of above pilot contamination was first noted in [1]
and a few works have been further reported to detect such
smart attacks. For example, the random pilot sequence was
employed in [2] to detect the presence of attack. A few number
of detection schemes were studied in [3] assuming different
knowledge about the large-scale fading parameters. A two-
way training scheme for discriminatory channel estimation was
proposed in [4] though a whitening-rotation based semiblind
method. Based on the Neyman-Pearson criterion, a number
of detection methods were developed in [5] under different
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Fig. 1. Alice is a multi-antenna base station sending messages to the intended
user Bob, while Eve is a malicious single-antenna eavesdropper.
assumptions about the channel and noise statistics. The authors
in [6] proposed an energy ratio detector, by exploring the
asymmetry of received signal power levels at the transmitter
Alice and legitimate receiver Bob in the presence of an attack.
Another recent work in [7] proposed superimposing a random
sequence on the training sequence at the Bob, allowing use
of source enumeration methods to detect attack. The idea
was further extended to the multiuser TDD/SDMA uplink
scenario [8].
All of the above detection works have assumed perfect
frequency synchronization in the system. However, carrier
frequency offset (CFO) naturally exists due to frequency mis-
match between transceiver oscillators [10], [11]. This means
both the legitimate user Bob and the attacker Eve should first
perform CFO estimation and oscillator frequency calibration,
such that the carrier frequency of their training signals can
be aligned to Alice. Although the CFOs are expected to be
completely eliminated for data transmission, however, they
may be beneficial to the purpose of pilot contamination attack.
Note that even the same pilot signals are transmitted from Bob
and Eve, the natural CFOs would bring in individual phase
shifts and thus result in divergence of the transmitted signals.
Motivated by the above observation, we propose a new
uncoordinated frequency shift (UFS) scheme for detection
of pilot contamination attack in multiple antenna system.
During the reverse training phase of the UFS scheme, Bob
deliberately introduces multiple random frequency shifts when
transmitting the publicly known pilot sequence. Eve has no
knowledge about these random frequency shifts, and should
be quite difficult to pretend exactly like Bob. This provides the
opportunity to detect the presence of Eve. We further develop
an attack detection algorithm based on source enumeration
method. Both the asymptotic detection performance analysis
and the numerical results are provided to verify the proposed
studies. The results demonstrate that the proposed UFS scheme
can achieve comparable detection performance as the existing
superimposed random sequence based scheme [7], but with
a substantially improved legitimate channel estimation perfor-
mance.
Notations: Superscripts (·)∗, (·)T and (·)H represent con-
jugate, transpose and Hermitian, respectively; E[·] denotes
expectation; ‖ · ‖ denotes the Frobenius norm operator; Cm×n
defines the vector space of all m × n complex matrices;
j =
√−1 is the imaginary unit; diag(x) is a diagonal matrix
with main diagonal of x; IN is the N ×N identity matrix; 0
represents all-zero matrix with appropriate dimension.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a transmission system
with a legitimate transmitter Alice equipped withM antennas,
a legitimate single-antenna user Bob, and an active eavesdrop-
per Eve. We consider a TDD communication system, where
the downlink channels and uplink channels are assumed to
be reciprocal. The uplink reverse training phase is a typical
way for Alice to obtain the channel information from Bob in
order to apply beamforming in downlink data transmission.
We consider the training pilot signals are repeatedly used and
publicly known, which allows the smart eavesdropper Eve be
able to transmit the same training signals to confound Alice.
The channels from Bob and Eve to Alice are respec-
tively modeled as the following length-M vectors: h =
[h(1), h(2), · · · , h(M)]T and g = [g(1), g(2), · · · , g(M)]T .
We assume each element of h and g follows i.i.d. complex
Gaussian distribution with variance 1/M , such that the total
average channel gains from Bob and Eve at all receive
antennas are normalized, i.e., E[‖h‖2] = 1 and E[‖g‖2] = 1.
Denote s = [s(1), s(2), · · · , s(N)]T as the publicly known
training sequence transmitted from Bob. Assume the symbols
s(n) are drawn from constant modulus constellations, i.e.,
|s(n)| = 1. Denote the transmit power of Bob and Eve by
PB and PE , respectively. We define two events, H0 and
H1; Namely, H0: there exists no active eavesdropper who
conducts pilot contamination attack; H1: the active eaves-
dropper conducts pilot contamination attack trying to steal
the information from the transmitter. Then, under perfect
frequency synchronization, the received signal at Alice during
the uplink training period can be expressed as the following
N ×M matrix:
H0 : Y =
√
PBsh
T +N, (1)
H1 : Y =
√
PBsh
T +
√
PEsg
T +N =
√
PBsh
T
eq +N,
(2)
where heq = h
T +
√
PE
PB
gT and N ∈ CN×M denotes the
corresponding additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) matrix.
Assume each element of N follows i.i.d. complex Gaussian
distribution with variance σ2n. It is clear that in the case of
Eve’s attack, Alice obtains a composite equivalent channel
heq instead of the expected h. If Alice is unaware of attack
and employs heq as the legitimate channel information in
the downlink beamforming design, this not only degrades the
signal reception quality at Bob but also leads to a significant
signal leakage to Eve during the subsequent downlink data
transmission.
III. PROPOSED TRAINING PHASE WITH UFS
From the comparison between (1) and (2), since Eve acts
exactly in the same way as Bob, it is in fact quite difficult for
Alice to distinguish whether Eve is presence or not. Motivated
by the fact that frequency asynchronous nature would result in
divergence between the transmitted signals from Bob and Eve,
and thus may facilitate the detection of pilot contamination
attack, we propose a new UFS scheme in this section to detect
the pilot contamination attack.
Without loss of generality, we assume the length-N training
sequence block can be divided into K equal-length segments,
each with Q symbols, i.e., N = K×Q. We can then split the
whole training sequence block s into
s =
[
sT1 , s
T
2 , · · · , sTK
]T
, (3)
where sk =
[
s(1+(k−1)Q), s(2+(k−1)Q), · · · , s(kQ)]T ∈
CQ×1 denotes the pilot symbols in the kth segment. In the
UFS scheme, Bob sends the pilot signals deliberately with
some random CFO-like phase shifts. Specifically, let Bob inde-
pendently select K artificial CFOs for each training segment,
namely ∆fB,k, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K . The normalized CFO of Bob
in the kth segment can be expressed as φB,k = ∆fB,kTs,
where Ts denotes the symbol rate interval. Thus, 2piφB,k
in fact represents the deliberately introduced phase shift of
Bob over the consecutive pilot symbols in the kth training
segment. On the other side, since Eve has no knowledge about
the random artificial CFOs of Bob, she can also randomly
select one trial CFO for each segment, denoted by ∆fE,k,
k = 1, 2, · · · ,K . Correspondingly, the normalized CFO of
Eve in the kth training segment can be expressed as φE,k =
∆fE,kTs.
Let E(φ) = diag(1, ej2piφ, · · · , ej2piφ(N−1)) stand for the
diagonal matrix representing the phase shift introduced by the
CFO φ. The equivalent transmitted pilot symbols from Bob
and Eve in the kth segment can be expressed as E(φB,k)sk
and E(φE,k)sk, respectively. Then, the received signals at
Alice in the kth segment can be expressed as the following
Q×M matrix:
H0 : Yk=
√
PBE(φB,k)skh
T +Nk,
H1 : Yk=
√
PBE(φB,k)skh
T+
√
PEE(φE,k)skg
T+Nk,
whereNk ∈ CQ×M denotes the corresponding AWGN matrix,
and each element of Nk is i.i.d. complex Gaussian variable
with variance σ2n.
The attack detection algorithms at Alice based on the
received signals Yk, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , will be developed in
the following sections. Next, we first consider the CFO and
channel estimation issue without Eve’s attack. Specifically,
when Eve is absent, the maximum-likelihood (ML) single-
user CFO estimation and channel estimation at Alice can be
performed as follows:
{φˆB,k, hˆ} = arg min
φ˜B,k,h˜
K∑
k=1
∥∥∥Yk −E(φ˜B,k)skh˜T ∥∥∥2, (4)
where φ˜B,k and h˜ stand for the trial CFO and channel for
Bob, respectively. The CFO estimation solution of (4) can be
expressed as
φˆB,k = argmax
φ˜
∥∥sHE(φ˜)HYk∥∥2, (5)
which targets at maximizing the correlation between the pilot
and the received signal after CFO compensation of a trial CFO
φ˜. The channel estimation solution can be then given by
hˆT =
1
N
K∑
k=1
sHE(φˆB,k)
HYk. (6)
Regarding the CFO and legitimate channel estimation per-
formance of UFS scheme, we obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: In the proposed UFS scheme, the CFO and
channel estimation mean square error (MSE) under the high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) condition in the absence of Eve’s
attack can be expressed as:
MSE(φˆB,k) =
3σ2n
2pi2Q(Q2 − 1)‖h‖2 , (7)
MSE(hˆ) =
σ2n
N
(
3
8pi2
Q− 1
Q+ 1
+M
)
. (8)
The detailed proof is omitted due to the space limitation. The
following observations can be made from Lemma 1: First,
as expected, the CFO estimation performance highly depends
on the length of each training segment. This says that for
better CFO estimation performance, a single training segment
is preferred, that is, K = 1 and Q = N . However, this may
not be a good choice for purpose of attack detection, which
will be discussed in the following sections. Nevertheless, we
see that the channel estimation performance, which is the main
concerned issue in our work, is basically irrelevant to the seg-
ment length. In other words, the legitimate channel estimation
performance is insensitive to the number of segments.
Second, the corresponding MSE performance without ar-
tificial frequency shifts in the conventional frequency syn-
chronous channel estimation can be obtained as Mσ2n/N .
As compared to this conventional benchmark, the relative
increased MSE in channel estimation of our UFS scheme can
be expressed as 1
M
3
8pi2
Q−1
Q+1 <
1
25M . The above discussions
indicate that the multiple artificial frequency shifts in our UFS
scheme introduce only negligible performance degradation in
legitimate channel estimation, especially with more receive
antennas at Alice. This differs from the existing superimposed
random sequence based scheme [7] which suffers from a lot
performance degradation in terms of the legitimate channel
estimation.
IV. PROPOSED UFS-MDL DETECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we develop a source enumeration based
algorithm, referred to as ‘UFS-MDL’, to detect the pres-
ence of attack at Alice based on the received signals Yk,
k = 1, 2, · · · ,K . The corresponding asymptotic detection
performance analysis is also provided.
A. Proposed Detection Scheme
Owing to the uncoordinated frequency shifts, our UFS train-
ing scheme introduces the divergence between the equivalent
transmitted pilot signals between Bob and Eve. Hence, for
the case M ≥ 3, the minimum description length (MDL)
algorithm [9] can be employed by Alice to detection the
presence of Eve.
Specifically, the autocorrelation matrix for the kth training
segment can be expressed as
Rk =
1
Q
E
[
YTkY
∗
k
]
. (9)
In the absence of attack, there holds
H0 : Rk = PBhhH + σ2nIM , (10)
which implies the dimension of signal subspace of Rk is only
one.
Let ∆φk = φB,k − φE,k represent the CFO between Bob
and Eve in the kth training segment. In the presence of Eve’s
attack, we have
H1 : Rk =[h,g]
[
PB
√
PBPEρk√
PBPEρ
∗
k PE
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pk
[h,g]H
+ σ2nIM . (11)
Here, Pk ∈ C2×2 represents the correlation of the equivalent
transmitted pilot signals between Bob and Eve, where
ρk =
1− ej2piQ∆φk
Q(1− ej2pi∆φk) . (12)
Theoretically, when ∆φk 6= 0, we have
det (Pk) = PBPE(1− |ρk|2) > 0, (13)
saying Pk is nonsingular in this case. The dimension of signal
subspace of Rk is two when ∆φk 6= 0.
Following the above discussions under H0 and H1, the
MDL criterion [9] can be employed to determine the di-
mensional of signal subspace. Specifically, denote the eigen-
values of Rˆk =
1
Q
YTkY
∗
k in descending order by λk(i),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,M . The MDL estimation of signal subspace
dimension for Rˆk can be given by
dˆk = arg min
1≤d≤M−1
MDLk(d), (14)
where
MDLk(d)=−
M∑
i=d+1
log(λk(i))+(M−d) log
( M∑
i=d+1
λk(i)
M − d
)
+
d(2M − d) log(Q)
2Q
. (15)
When the signal subspace dimension of at least one training
segment is above one, i.e., max
k
dˆk > 1, we declare the
presence of Eve’s attack. Otherwise, we consider the Eve’s
attack is absence.
B. Asymptotic Performance Analysis
In the subsection, we provide asymptotic performance anal-
ysis for the proposed UFS-MDL detection algorithm. We
consider the high SNR condition. Moreover, both the training
sequence length and the receive antenna number at Alice are
assumed to be very large, i.e, N ≫ 1 and M ≫ 1. Note that
there is an increasing interest from both academy and industry
to equip base station with a large scale antenna array [12],
[13], such a system can provide a remarkable increase in both
reliability and spectral efficiency. We focus on the asymptotic
false negative (miss detection) probability, which is defined as
the probability when miss of detection happens. The following
Lemma can be obtained:
Lemma 2: Assume the random normalized CFOs of Bob
and Eve follow uniform distribution from −φmax to φmax
with |φmax| < 0.5. Denote Pth = M( Q
√
Q − 1)σ2n. When
the minimum power of Bob and Eve is larger than Pth, i.e.,
min(PB , PE) > Pth, the asymptotic miss detection probabil-
ity of the UFS-MDL detection algorithm can be approximately
upper bounded by
PMDL =
(
2
piQφmax
arccos
√(
1− Pth
PB
)(
1− Pth
PE
))K
.
(16)
Otherwise, when min(PB , PE) ≤ Pth, the miss detec-
tion probability of UFS-MDL approximately equal one, i.e.,
PMDL . 1. The detailed proof is omitted due to the space
limitation. The following observations can be made from
Lemma 2: 1) As expected, the miss detection probability of
UFS-MDL can be reduced by increasing the range of random
artificial CFOs. The asymptotic miss detection probability is
also relevant to the noise power and the number of receive
antennas. There exists a cliff-like jump of miss detection prob-
ability when the minimum power between Bob and Eve be-
comes less than Pth. 2) We see that the detection performance
of UFS-MDL can always benefit from the increased attack
power from Eve. Interestingly, the detection performance will
asymptotically touch a lower bound when attack power PE
becomes very large. Specifically, when PE ≫ PB , according
to (16), the asymptotic lower bound of UFS-MDL can be
obtained as
PMDL &
(
2
piQφmax
arccos
√(
1− Pth
PB
))K
. (17)
It is observed that this lower bound can be simply reduced
by a larger transmit power at Bob. 3) The equation (16) also
demonstrates the benefit from the multiple frequency shifts in
UFS-MDL.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate
the performance of the proposed scheme. Assume the pilot
symbols are randomly drawn from QPSK constellation. Unless
otherwise specified, the pilot length is taken as N = 64 and
let normalized artificial CFOs of Bob and Eve in each training
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Fig. 2. Miss detection probability of the proposed UFS-MDL algorithm with
different relative power between Bob and Eve. The corresponding asymptotic
analytical performance is included as the dashed curves, while the asymptotic
lower bound in (17) is plotted as the dotted curves.
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Fig. 3. Detection performance comparison between the SRS-MDL
scheme [7] and the proposed UFS scheme (M = 16, PB/σ
2
n =20 dB).
segment follow uniform distribution from -0.2 to 0.2, i.e.,
φmax = 0.2.
In Fig. 2, we show miss detection probability of our UFS-
MDL algorithm as a function of the relative power between
Bob and Eve (PB/PE) under different SNR condition PB/σ
2
n.
The following observations can be made. First, as expected,
the performance of UFS-MDL can be improved with stronger
signal power from Eve. Second, we see that the simulation
results closely match the corresponding asymptotic results,
which verifies the correctness of the asymptotic analysis.
Especially, when Eve has much stronger power than Bob, we
can observe that the detection performance converges to the
analytical lower bound given by (17).
The detection performance of UFS-MDL with different K
is plotted in Fig. 3. We also include the performance of
the superimposed random sequence based MDL scheme [7],
labelled as ‘SRS-MDL’. The results show that when Eve has
smaller or similar power as Bob, the proposed scheme can
achieve comparable detection performance as SRS-MDL with
a relative large K and a larger maximum artificial CFO φmax.
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Fig. 4. Detection performance of the proposed UFS scheme with different
maximum artificial CFOs (M = 16, PB/σ
2
n = 20dB and PB = PE).
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Fig. 5. Channel estimation performance comparison between the SRS-MDL
scheme [7] and the proposed UFS scheme.
However, SRS-MDL behaves better in the region with much
stronger attack power. Note that the performance of UFS-
MDL approaches a lower bound as the attack power increases.
Nevertheless, as the random sequences are superimposed in the
pilot signal in SRS-MDL, our UFS scheme could substantially
outperform SRS-MDL in terms of channel estimation, which
will be demonstrated below.
In Fig. 4, we increase the maximum artificial CFO φmax
from 0 to 0.3 and demonstrate the detection performance
evolution of our UFS scheme. As expected, we see that the
detection performance of our proposed UFS scheme can be
improved by increasing the maximum artificial CFOs. The
results also clearly indicate the benefit of multiple segments.
It is seen that, in the case of more segments, i.e., a larger
K , more random artificial CFOs are introduced and the
miss detection probability could decline more quickly as the
maximum CFO increases.
In the last, we plot the channel estimation performance com-
parison between SRS-MDL and our UFS scheme in Fig. 5. The
MSE of channel estimation is adopted as the figure of merit.
We assume absence of Eve in this example. The iterative chan-
nel estimation method is employed in SRS-MDL as described
in [7]. It is seen that the channel estimation performance of
both SRS-MDL and our scheme improves with increasing
the pilot signal length. Moreover, our scheme show no much
changes with different K . Note that SRS-MDL superimposes
the self-contamination random sequences in the pilot signal,
inevitably degrading the performance of legitimate channel
estimation. In comparison, our scheme could outperform SRS-
MDL especially with a shorter pilot sequence. On the other
side, we include the corresponding analytical results from (8)
with K = 1 in this figure, plotted as the dotted curve. The
conventional channel estimation performance with frequency
synchronization is also included, labelled as ‘SYNC’. It is
observed that the simulation results of our scheme closely
approach the analytical curve and the SYNC benchmark. This
coincides with our previous observation that the proposed
UFS scheme basically does not sacrifice the legitimate channel
estimation performance for attack detection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new UFS scheme for detection
of pilot contamination attack. The proposed scheme deliber-
ately introduces multiple random frequency shifts in the trans-
mitted pilot signal from the legitimate user Bob. A detection
algorithms were designed for Alice to detect the presence of
attack. We also provided both the asymptotic performance
analysis and numerical results to verify the proposed studies.
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